In United States v. Dunn, No. 22-11731 (Oct. 10, 2023) (Jordan, Rosenbaum, Hull), the Court affirmed the denial of Mr. Dunn's motion to dismiss his indictment. Mr. Dunn was arrested on a criminal complaint at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic--on March 10, 2020--but was not formally indicted until December 1, 2020.  He argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict him within 30 days from his arrest--as required by the Speedy Trial Act. The Court found that the pandemic-related continuances in 2020--that continued grand jury sessions five times in the ends of justice spanning March 26, 2020 to November 16, 2020--were not an abuse of discretion and were within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202211731.pdf http://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/

In United States v. Steiger, No. 22-10742 (Oct. 3, 2023) (William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Coogler (N.D. Ala.)), the Court vacated Mr. Steiger's sentence and remanded for resentencing. Mr. Steiger appealed his sentence of 20 years' imprisonment following the revocation of his probation.  The Guidelines recommended a sentence of 12 to 18 months imprisonment. The Court vacated and remanded for resentencing because the district court did not give any reason for why it was imposing an above-guideline sentence, as required by § 3553(c)(2) and United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2016).  The Court reiterated that it had adopted a per se rule of reversal for   §3553(c)(2) errors.  Thus, because the district court's statements at sentencing were not sufficiently specific to allow the Court to understand why it imposed an above-guideline sentence, the Court vacated and remanded.  The Court rejected the government's suggestion that it look at the context and record from the entire revocation proceeding to glean the reasoning for the sentence imposed. Chief Judge William Pryor concurred, but urged the Court to rehear the case en banc to reconsider Parks, which requires a per se rule of reversal for  § 3553(c)(2) errors even when a defendant fails to object to the explanation [...]

In United States v. Robinson, No. 22-10949 (Sept. 28, 2023) (Jordan, Rosenbaum, Newsom), the Court vacated the defendant’s contempt conviction for violating a civil injunction against a stun-gun company. The Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient that the defendant was bound by the injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Most notably, the Court declined to consider whether the defendant was liable under an aiding and abetting theory because the government failed to pursue that theory in the district court. And, relying on recent Supreme Court decisions in Percoco and Ciminelli, as well as fair-notice principles, the Court concluded that it could not affirm on a ground that the government did not advance in the district court, a rule that applied equally to bench trials as well as jury trials. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202210949.pdf http://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/

In Jones v. United States, No. 20-13365 (Sept. 14, 2023) (Wilson, Luck, Lagoa), the Court directed the district court to dismiss a second 2255 motion for lack of jurisdiction. Jones filed a 2255 motion to vacate his mandatory life sentence under 3559, arguing that its residual clause was unconstitutionally vague in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis. On appeal, the government agreed that 3559’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague and that Jones was otherwise entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit appointed an amicus to defend the district court’s ruling. Although not even the amicus raised this argument, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Jones could not satisfy the gatekeeping requirement in 2255(h)(2) for a second 2255 motion. The reason was that, although the Supreme Court had declared numerous other similar residual clauses unconstitutional, there was no Supreme Court decision specifically declaring 3559’s residual clause unconstitutional. Judge Wilson dissented, arguing that Jones was relying on the same rule of law announced in Johnson, as well as Dimaya and Davis, since that rule was not limited to the specific residual clauses struck down in those cases. He said that [...]

In United States v. Talley, No. 22-13921 (Sept. 7, 2023) (Wilson, Grant, Brasher), the Court vacated the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release. The defendant committed the supervised release violation after the term of supervision had lapsed but while he was a fugitive from justice. The Court held that the district court erred in tolling the period of supervised release based on his fugitive status for absconding from supervision. The Court reasoned that the fugitive tolling doctrine, which applies in the context of senteces of imprisonment, did not apply in the context of supervised release. And the Court reasoned that the statutory text contemplated only two circumstances where a term of supervision may be tolled, neither of which related to fugitive status. In so holding, the Court joined the First Circuit and parted ways with three other circuits. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202213921.pdf http://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/