In United States v. Kent, No. 22-13068 (Feb. 26, 2024) (Wilson, Jill Pryor, Brasher), the Court affirmed Mr. Kent's conviction. Mr. Kent was charged with RICO conspiracy and five substantive crimes, including an attempted murder.  The government alleged that the gang Mr. Kent was allegedly a member of murdered a former gang member--Rhodes--for cooperating with the police's investigation into the attempted murder of another individual--Muhammad. Specifically, the government’s theory was that Mr. Kent and other alleged gang members believed that Rhodes told the police that Mr. Kent had attempted to murder Muhammad and, then, murdered Rhodes for that reason.  To support this theory, the government introduced an investigator’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a related case, which identified Rhodes as cooperating with law enforcement to implicate Mr. Kent in the attempted murder of Muhammad.  By offering the testimony, the government sought to establish that other gang members present at the hearing learned of Rhodes’s apparent cooperation and murdered him because of it, i.e., the government offered the out-of-court statements for the effect they had on the listener. Mr. Kent challenged the admission of the above testimony, arguing it was hearsay and admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause.  The Court disagreed, finding [...]

In Rudolph v. United States, No. 21-12828 (Feb. 12, 2024) (Wilson, Grant, Brasher), the Court found Mr. Rudolph's attempts to collaterally attack his sentences barred by his plea agreement. In order to avoid the death penalty for setting off a series of bombs (some during the Olympics in Atlanta), Mr. Rudolph pleaded guilty to six federal arson charges and four counts of use of a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence.  As part of his plea deal, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, as well as his right to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.  His waiver specifically stated: "In consideration of the Government’s recommended disposition, the defendant voluntarily and expressly waives, to the maximum extent permitted by federal law, the right to appeal his conviction and sentence in this case, and the right to collaterally attack his sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including motions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or 18 U.S.C. § 3771, on any ground." Post-Davis, however, Mr. Rudolph filed a § 2255 motion to vacate his § 924(c) convictions and sentences because his arson offenses no longer qualified as crimes of [...]

In United States v. Sanfilippo, No. 22-11175 (Feb. 8, 2024) (Jordan, Lagoa, Marcus), the Court dismissed Mr. Sanfilippo's appeal. Mr. Sanfilippo appealed his conviction for wire fraud pursuant to a guilty plea.  He argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment against him because it was issued after the expiration of the federal statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282.  More specifically, he argued that the district court misinterpreted § 3282(a), and thus incorrectly concluded that the government indicted him within the statute of limitations by filing an information.  His argument specifically relied on a case that was pending before this Court at the time of his plea--United States v. B.G.G.  At the change of plea hearing, the government noted that if it turned out that the government was in error by filing an information within the statute of limitations, Mr. Sanfilippo "would be exonerated at that point, just as a matter of fundamental fairness." The government further noted that what it would do was "allow [Sanfilippo] to withdraw his guilty plea, and then [the government] would have to dismiss the charges, because the statute of limitations had run.  Sanfilippo would be able to file a [...]

In United States v. Daniels, No. 22-10408 (Jan. 24, 2024) (Jordan, Lagoa, Marcus), the Court affirmed Mr. Daniels's convictions and sentence. Mr. Daniels was convicted of ten counts of Hobbs Act robbery and sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. On appeal, he first argued that the district court erred by rejecting his proposed jury instruction on eyewitness identifications, taken from the Third Circuit's model instructions.  The Court disagreed, finding that the instructions given substantially covered Mr. Daniels's proposed instruction on eyewitness identifications. He next argued that cumulative evidentiary errors prejudiced his right to a fair trial.  Applying plain error review to the claims of evidentiary error, the Court disagreed. He also argued that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict him under Count 7 of the superseding indictment.  First, he argued that no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the robber in Count 7 threatened the victim with force or violence—a necessary condition for Hobbs Act robbery. Second, he argued that no reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the robbery alleged in Count 7.  The Court rejected both arguments. Finally, he argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court accounted for Mr. [...]

In United States v. Pugh, No. 21-13136 (Jan. 18, 2024) (Lagoa, Brasher, Boulee (N.D. Ga.)), the Court affirmed Ms. Pugh's conviction. The Court addressed an issue of first impression regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3), which prohibits impeding law enforcement officers during a civil disorder affecting interstate commerce.  It was alleged that during a protest in Mobile, Alabama, Ms. Pugh shattered the window of a police car that was blocking protestors from walking on the interstate.  Ms. Pugh moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 231(a)(3) is facially unconstitutional because it: (1) exceeds Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, (2) is a substantially overbroad regulation of speech and expressive conduct, activities protected by the First Amendment, (3) is a content-based restriction of expressive activities in violation of the First Amendment, and (4) fails to provide fair notice and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. With regard to Ms. Pugh's first argument--that § 231(a)(3) is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause--the Court disagreed because the statute's jurisdictional element--the requirement that the civil disorder “in any way or degree obstruct[], delay[], or adversely affect[] commerce”--is enough to limit the statute’s scope [...]

In United States v. Gatlin, No. 20-14149 (Jan. 5, 2024) (Jordan, Luck, Lagoa), the Court reversed Mr. Gatlin's conviction and sentence as to witness tampering, but affirmed his sex trafficking of a minor and production of child pornography convictions and sentences, as well as the restitution order. Mr. Gatlin appealed his convictions and sentences for sex trafficking of a minor (Count 1), production of child pornography (Count 2), and witness tampering (Count 3). On appeal, Mr. Gatlin argued first that the evidence was insufficient as to all counts.  The Court disagreed with regard to Count 1, finding the evidence sufficient.  With regard to Count 2--production of child pornography--the Court disagreed with Mr. Gatlin's argument that § 2251 requires a specific intent to produce child pornography and that child pornography produced incidentally to a sexual encounter is insufficient.  The Court held that specific intent does not require that the defendant be single-minded in his purpose--it was enough for the government to show that making explicit photographs was a purpose for engaging in sexual activity with the victim.  With regard to Count 3--witness tampering--the Court agreed with Mr. Gatlin that the evidence was insufficient as to intent because he asked the victim to lie only to [...]