In United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez & Jovan Rivera Rodriguez, No. 23-12977 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (Pryor CJ, Branch, Abudu)—a government appeal—the Court held that a district court, when considering a government motion to depart from a statutory minimum for substantial assistance, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) & USSG 5K1.1, may not depart further from the statutory minimum on the basis of other sentencing factors (e.g., 18 USC § 3553(a) factors) that do not relate to the substantial assistance provided. In coming to this primarily textual conclusion, the Court contrasted § 3553(e) with § 3553(f), in that the wording of the latter “safety-valve” subsection does “allow the district court to sentence as it pleases and to consider all the subsection (a) factors.” The Court also found that prior precedent compelled the same conclusion, and noted that every other circuit to consider this question had come to the same conclusion about § 3553(e). Since the district court had imposed reduced sentences pursuant to both §§ 3553(e) and—over the government’s objections—(a) factors, the Court vacated and remanded the defendants’ sentences for resentencing.
Abudu concurred “to highlight broader concerns about” the “asymmetry” that results from § 3553(e), and suggesting that, “[a]s a matter of public policy, and perhaps due process, a sentencing framework that allows wide discretion to increase one’s sentence while barring comparable discretion for downward departures warrants reevaluation.”
Perez Opinion here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202312336.pdf