In United States v. Joseph Lamont Ott, No. 24-13812 (11th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (Grant, Lagoa, Wilson), the Court held that, pursuant to November 1, 2023 amendments to the sentencing guidelines, any attempt to commit a qualifying “crime of violence,” will itself qualify as a “crime of violence,” pursuant to the “unambiguous” language of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(d). The Court accordingly found that Ott’s prior conviction for New York attempted second-degree robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” (and career-offender predicate), because it had previously held that substantive robbery was a “crime of violence,” under the ACCA elements clause,* which was identical to the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court’s 2022 holding, in Taylor, that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a “crime of violence,” under § 924(c)(3), because, “the statute in Taylor has no provision like U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(d), which specifically expands the scope of qualifying predicate crimes to cover inchoate offenses.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)).
Opinion here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202413812.pdf
*Note that the ACCA, like § 924(c)(3), but unlike § 4B1.2(d), also lacks a provision that “specifically expands the scope of qualifying predicate crime to cover inchoate offenses.” So inchoate offenses that qualify as a guideline “crime of violence,” may not qualify as a “violent felony,” or “crime of violence,” under ACCA and § 924(c)(3).