In Caldwell v. United States, No. 19-15024 (Aug. 16, 2023) (William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Coogler (N.D. Ala.), a consolidated appeal, the Court vacated one of Mr. Caldwell's convictions and his sentence due to an intervening precedent, but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences of the other defendants. Defendants--alleged members of the Gangster Disciples gang--were charged with conspiring to conduct and participate directly and indirectly in the conduct of the Gangster Disciples through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c).  The defendants were also charged with the enhanced sentencing provision of the Act, for allegedly joining and remaining in the conspiracy, knowing and agreeing that members of the enterprise engaged in acts involving murder, in violation of O.C.G. 16-5-1.  They raised a number of challenges on appeal. First, they challenged the district court's denial of their motion to show prospective jurors a video on unconscious bias prepared by the district court for the Western District of Washington as well as proposed voir dire questions regarding the same.  The Court found no abuse of discretion by the district court. Second, they challenged the district court's denial of their motion to admit [...]

In United States v. Lopez, No. 21-12709 (Aug. 7, 2023) (William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Grant), the Court, in the immigration context, held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. In so holding, the Court applied the categorical approach.  It noted that when an individual has been convicted of a conspiracy crime--like Ms. Lopez, who was convicted of conspiracy to launder money under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)--the categorical approach demands that courts determine whether the underlying substantive offense is divisible if it would otherwise be overbroad.  Here, the Court found § 1956(h) to be divisible by the underlying crimes a defendant could be convicted of conspiring to commit because it prohibits "conspir[ing] to commit any offense defined in [section 1956] or section 1957" of Title 18. Here, Shepard documents clarified that Ms. Lopez was charged under § 1956(h) with conspiring to launder money in violation of sections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1957.  The Court found § 1957 to be indivisible.  As to § 1956(a)(1)(B), the Court cited to the Second Circuit in holding that §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) outline two means of committing the same knowing-concealment crime.  That is, they are different means of committing the same offense, not two separate offenses.  In so [...]

In United States v. Moore, No. 21-12291 (Aug. 11, 2023) (Lagoa, Brasher, Ed Carnes), the Court affirmed Mr. Moore's conviction and sentence. Mr. Moore was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  He proceeded to trial and asserted a justification defense.  He was found guilty and sentenced to 80 months imprisonment. Mr. Moore first challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal or new trial based on his justification defense. The Court rejected his challenge, and affirmed his conviction.  In so doing, the Court clarified the different standards that apply for granting a judgment of acquittal versus a new trial.  For a Rule 29(a) motion for a judgment for acquittal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices are drawn in its favor.  For a Rule 33(a) motion for a new trial, the district court may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses, but reversal of a jury's verdict is reserved for really exceptional cases in which evidence of guilt, although legally sufficient, is thin and marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.  That is, a new trial is justified [...]

In United States v. Rodriguez, No. 20-13534 (Aug. 1, 2023) (William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Grant), the Court affirmed in part and vacated in part Mr. Rodriguez's sentence, and remanded for a limited resentencing. Mr. Rodriguez appealed his sentence for possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The Court agreed that Mr. Rodriguez was entitled to a limited resentencing because the district court erred by imposing conditions of supervised release in the written judgment that were not orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing.  The Court held that a district court must pronounce at the defendant’s sentencing hearing any discretionary conditions of supervised release—that is, any condition of supervised release other than those mandatory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).  The Court noted that a district court may do so by expressly incorporating a written list detailing the conditions, and does not need to individually pronounce each discretionary condition at sentencing. The Court rejected Mr. Rodriguez's other challenges to his sentence, finding no clear error in the district court's imposition of a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12); [...]

In United States v. Miles, No. 21-12609 (Lagoa, Brasher, Boulee), the Court vacated the defendant’s ACCA sentence. The Court held that a prior Florida conviction for unlawful possession of a listed chemical under Fla. Stat. 893.149 is not a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. The elements of that offense requires one to possess the chemical with reasonable cause to believe that some person will use it to manufacture a controlled substance. However, that conduct does not itself involve (i.e., necessarily entail) “manufacturing” or “possessing with intent to manufacture” a controlled substance, as required by ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202112609.pdf http://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/

In United States v. Gary, No. 21-13249 (July 21, 2023) (Wilson, Luck, Hull) (per curiam), the Court held upheld the defendant’s ACCA sentence. The Court held that Florida aggravated assault qualified as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause. The Court relied on its decision in Somers, which reached that same conclusion after the Florida Supreme Court held that simple assault could not be committed recklessly. Therefore, the offense remained a qualifying predicate notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202113249.pdf http://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/