In Beeman v. United States, No. 16-16710 (Sept. 22, 2017) (Julie Carnes, Edmondson, Kathleen Williams), the Court held that an initial 2255 movant bringing an ACCA Johnson claim failed to meet his burden of proof, because he could not prove that it was more likely than not that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause, as opposed to another clause. As an initial matter, the Court agreed that the 2255 motion was in part timely under 2255(f)(3). His motion alleged that his prior conviction for Georgia aggravated assault was no longer a violent felony, both because it did not satisfy the elements clause after Descamps and because it did not satisfy the residual clause after Johnson.  Although the Court found that the Descamps aspect of that claim was untimely, it found that the Johnson aspect was timely. However, it affirmed on the ground that the movant could not meet his burden to show that the sentencing court had relied on the residual clause.  The Court relied heavily on the burden of proof in 2255 proceedings being on the movant, and it refused to place that burden on the government merely because sentencing courts did not specify the [...]

In United States v. Williams, No. 16-16444 (Sept. 20, 2017) (Tjoflat, Hull, William Pryor) (per curiam), the Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. First, the Court concluded that the search of an outbuilding adjacent to the defendant's residence was lawful, because the search was a reasonable entry pursuant to an arrest warrant for the defendant.  The totality of the circumstances supported the agents' belief that the defendant lived on the property, either in the main residence or in the outbuilding (both were possible living spaces), and that he was present in one of those two buildings at the time the warrant was executed (since his car was there and it was early in the morning). Second, the Court alternatively concluded that the search of the outbuilding, while the defendant was being arrested in the main residence, was a valid protective sweep.  The outbuilding was a separate structure 20 feet away, there was noise indicating that drug distribution activities might be occurring on the property, and there were three cars parked in the driveway, suggesting that more people might be on the premises and pose a danger. Finally, the Court, applying plain error, rejected the [...]

In United States v. Masino, No. 16-15451 (Sept. 7, 2017) (William Pryor, Ed Carnes, Moore), the Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment charging a violation of the federal gambling statute. The issue was whether an indictment alleging a violation of Florida's bingo and gambling statutes sufficiently alleged an element of the federal gambling statute--namely, that the business is an illegal gambling business, which turned on whether it "is a violation" of state law.  The Court concluded that it did, because there were at least some violations of Florida's bingo statute that could render the business an illegal gambling business under federal law.  For example, the business would be illegal if it allowed charities to sponsor the event without their direct involvement, or if it did not return all bingo proceeds to the players.  The Court therefore did not address whether Florida gambling statutes could serve as a basis for upholding the indictment. One defendant cross-appealed regarding the court's failure to dismiss the count of the indictment in its entirety.  The Court, however, declined to exercise its discretion to consider that cross appeal under the doctrine of pendant appellate jurisdiction. Recent News [...]