Legal News & Updates
United States v. Tinker, No. 20-14474 (Sept. 28, 2021)
In United States v. Tinker, No. 20-14474 (Sept. 28, 2021) (Wilson, Newsom, Branch) (per curiam), the Court held that a district court does not procedurally err when it denies a request for compassionate release based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors (or U.S.S.G. 1B1.13's policy statement) without first explicitly determining whether the defendant could present "extraordinary and compelling reasons." The Court noted that nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to conduct the compassionate-release analysis in any particular order. Therefore, nothing requires a court to first find "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for release before considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors or U.S.S.G. 1B1.13's policy statement. Under 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary conditions are satisfied before it grants a reduction--i.e., support in the 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to 1B1.13's policy statement. The absence of even one would foreclose a sentence reduction. Therefore, a district court does not err where, as occurred in this case, it assumes that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist in the 3582(c)(1)(A) context. The Court further found no error in the district court's analysis of the 3553(a) factors. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202014474.pdf https://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/
Somers v. United States, No. 19-11484 (Sept. 28, 2021)
In Somers v. United States, No. 19-11484 (Sept. 28, 2021) (Jill Pryor, Anderson, and Marcus), the Court granted the petition for rehearing, vacated its previous opinion and judgment, substituted this opinion in its place, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following two questions about the nature of Florida's assault statutes: Does the first element of assault as defined in Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1) -- "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another" -- require specific intent? If not, what is the mens rea required to prove that element of the statute? The Court reconsidered its opinion after the Supreme Court's decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). In supplemental briefing, movant argued that Borden abrogated Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2021)--wherein the Court held that a Florida conviction for aggravated assault categorically qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause--because Florida aggravated assault is not a specific-intent crime. In response, the government argued that the specific intent to threaten another is an element of Florida aggravated assault. Because the Florida Supreme Court has not answered the question of whether Florida aggravated assault requires specific intent, or [...]
United States v. Watkins, No. 18-14336 (Sept. 16, 2021)
In United States v. Watkins, No. 18-14336 (Sept. 16, 2021) (Luck, Ed Carnes, Marcus), on remand from the en banc Court, the Court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The Court originally reversed the district court's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress on the government's interlocutory appeal. Though the government conceded that it violated the Fourth Amendment when GPS tracking devices placed inside an intercepted package re-activated inside the defendant's home, the Court held that there was a "reasonable probability" that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered because the agents would have conducted the same knock and talk with the same result. The case was then reconsidered en banc. The en banc Court held that the standard of proof that the government must meet in order to establish that evidence would have been inevitably discovered is the preponderance of the evidence, not a "reasonable probability." The en banc Court remanded the case back to the original panel for further proceedings consistent with its holding. On remand, the Court, applying the preponderance of the evidence standard--whether the evidence more likely than not would have been discovered--concluded that it would have been. In so holding, the Court found [...]
United States v. Braddy, No. 19-12823 (Aug. 31, 2021)
In United States v. Braddy, No. 19-12823 (Aug. 31, 2021) (Rosenbaum, Lagoa, Ed Carnes), the Court affirmed the denial a motion to suppress. First, the Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion make the traffic stop after observing bicycles obstructing the car’s Florida license plate. The defendant argued that Alabama traffic law did not apply to him as a non-resident Florida driver. The Court held that, regardless of whether the defendant’s interpretation of Alabama law was correct, the officer’s interpretation by the officer was objectively reasonable. Second, the Court held that the officer did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. The officer’s questions about the driver’s travels plans and itinerary, as well as the address on his license and ownership of the vehicle, were ordinary inquiries related to the purpose of the stop. A dog sniff of the car also did not unlawfully prolong the stop because the sniff was conducted while the officer was still waiting for a warrant check to come back before issuing a warning. Third, the drug-sniffing dogs were sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to search the car. The district court did not clearly err by crediting the officers’ testimony about the dogs’ training [...]
In re: Sealed Searched Warrant and Application for a Warrant by Telephone or Other Reliable Electronic Means (United States v. Korf et al.), No. 20-14223 (Aug. 30, 2021)
In In re: Sealed Searched Warrant and Application for a Warrant by Telephone or Other Reliable Electronic Means (United States v. Korf et al.), No. 20-14223 (Aug. 30, 2021) (Martin, Rosenbaum, Luck) (per curiam), the Court upheld the denial of a motion to enjoin the use of a government filter team. The government executed a search warrant at a suite of offices, and included in the materials seized were those from the office of an in-house attorney. Relying on Rule 41(g), the clients intervened and sought an injunction prohibiting the government’s filter team—consisting of government attorneys and staff who were not involved in the investigation—from reviewing any potentially privileged documents without their consent or court approval. On appeal, the Court first concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction because the intervenors sought only the return of their property, not invalidation of the seizure, and that was sufficiently independent of any forthcoming criminal judgment. However, the Court found no abuse of discretion in denying the request for injunctive relief because the intervenors could not show a substantial likelihood that they would succeed on their claim that a government filter team per se violates their rights, or that the filter protocol in place [...]
Mitchell v. Duvall County et al., No. 19-14505 (Aug. 26, 2021)
In Mitchell v. Duvall County et al., No. 19-14505 (Aug. 26, 2021) (Branch, Grant, Tjoflat), the Court re-affirmed that it clearly violates the First Amendment for prison officials to open an inmate’s legal mail outside of his presence. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201914505.pdf https://defensenewsletter.blogspot.com/