In United States v. Colston, No. 19-13518 (July 13, 2021) (Grant, Tjoflat, Ed Carnes), the Court affirmed defendant's convictions for knowingly possessing with intent to distribute 2 kg of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and conspiring to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Defendant walked into a post office, showed a tracking receipt on her phone, and walked out with a package containing roughly $200,000 worth of cocaine.  Unbeknownst to her, however, law enforcement had already flagged the package, and arrested her as soon as she picked it up. On appeal, defendant first argued that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions because the government failed to prove that she specifically knew the package contained cocaine.  Though the government agreed that proof of knowledge of the specific drug was an element of the offense, the Court disagreed, and held that the government need only prove that a defendant knew she possessed a controlled substance, not knowledge of the specific substance she possessed.  The Court clarified that when the government charges violations of § 841(a)(1) and also seeks enhanced penalties under § 846, it needs to prove a defendant's mens rea only for the substantive violation, not for the [...]

In United States v. Stancil, 19-12001 (July 13, 2021) (Branch, Grant, Tjoflat), the Court affirmed the defendant's ACCA-enhanced conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm.   Defendant was pulled over for speeding one night.  When officers approached his car, they saw him reach down several times.  They also smelled marijuana when defendant lowered his window.  They asked the defendant to step out of his vehicle and ran his driver's license, which revealed that he was a convicted felon on probation.  While one officer checked defendant's license, another searched his car and found a firearm under the driver's side floor mat.   Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, which the district court denied.  He then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, and was found guilty.  At sentencing, the district court determined that his three prior Virginia drug convictions were serious drug offenses under the ACCA, and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.   As to the prior Virginia drug convictions, defendant argued that the least culpable conduct included "giving or possessing with intent to give a controlled substance to another" without intent to profit, and therefore was overbroad.  The Court disagreed, analogizing to similar Alabama statutes analyzed in Hollis v. United States and United [...]

In United States v. Phillips, No. 18-11737 (July 13, 2021) (Jill Pryor, Grant, Royal (MD Ga)), the Court affirmed in part and vacated in part defendant's convictions relating to child pornography. Defendant was charged with, and convicted of: (1) knowingly and intentionally using, persuading, inducing, and enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e); (2) knowingly receiving, and attempting to receive, material containing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1); and (3) knowingly possessing, and attempting to possess, material containing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). On appeal, defendant first challenged the jury instruction given as to count 1.  He argued that the district court constructively amended the indictment because the indictment charged him with "knowingly and intentionally" causing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, while the court's instruction to the jury noted that the government need not prove that the defendant knew the victim was a minor.  The Court found no reversible error because the statute does not require that the defendant know his victim's age; therefore, the district court did not [...]

In United States v. Leonard, No. 19-14142 (July 8, 2021) (Martin, Grant, Brasher), the Court held that an indictment's failure to set out an element of the offense does not warrant an automatic presumption of prejudice to the defendant.  Any such error is subject to the harmless-error inquiry. Defendant was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm prior to the Supreme Court's issuance of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).  Once the Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Rehaif, the government, in an abundance of caution, superseded defendant's indictment to include the knowledge element.  The defendant moved to dismiss the new indictment as legally insufficient, which the district court denied. On appeal, defendant challenged his indictment, the district court's refusal to reopen his suppression hearing, the district court's denial of his motion to hold a hearing to challenge the search warrant affidavit, whether cumulative trial errors warranted reversal, and the propriety of his sentence. With regard to the indictment, the Court held that an indictment that references only § 922(g) and not also § 924(a)(2) is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.  Additionally, the indictment was itself legally sufficient and gave defendant adequate notice of the elements the government needed [...]

In United States v. Matthews, No. 20-10554 (July 6, 2021) (Wilson, Rosenbaum, Ed Carnes), the Court affirmed the defendant's 57-month sentence for making false statements to a firearms dealer. Defendant objected to the application of enhancements for (1) an offense involving a semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and (2) having a prior conviction for a crime of violence. The Court first acknowledged that neither it nor its sister circuits had published an opinion addressing how the sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(3) applies when the underlying offense is making a false statement to a firearms dealer. At issue here is the commentary's definition of semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine as "a magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition was in close proximity to the firearm.  Here, the district court reasonably inferred that a magazine capable of accepting more than 15 rounds of ammunition--that comes standard with the rifle defendant tried to purchase--was in close proximity to the rifle defendant tried to purchase.  As such, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. The Court also reaffirmed that a conviction for felony battery under [...]

In Pitts v. United States, No. 18-12096 (July 6, 2021) (Luck, Ed Carnes, Marcus), the Court affirmed the denial of Pitts's  Johnson-based second or successive § 2255 motion. Pitts was sentenced as an armed career criminal based upon the following prior convictions: (1) a 1978 California conviction for robbery with a firearm; (2) a 1982 California conviction for robbery and forcible rape; (3) a 1993 Florida conviction for delivery of cocaine; and (4) a 2001 Florida conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. On appeal, the Court addressed whether Pitts carried his burden of showing that the district court that sentenced him erred under the Johnson decision in counting his two robbery convictions as ACCA predicate violent felonies.  It found that he had not under Beeman.  A movant can meet his Beeman burden in one of two ways: first, by pointing to evidence in the record showing that the district court relied only on the residual clause in sentencing him--evidence which may include comments made by the parties, by the sentencing judge, or in the PSR; second, by showing that when he was sentenced, binding precedent clearly established that the predicate offense was a violent felony only under the ACCA's residual clause. Here, Pitts failed to [...]