In United States v. Mosley, No. 20-11146 (Apr. 21, 2022) (William Pryor, Jordan, Brown (N.D. Ga.)) (per curiam), the Court vacated Mr. Mosley's sentence and remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Mosley pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2).  At sentencing, his advisory Guidelines' range was calculated to be 37 to 46 months' imprisonment.  Both his attorney and the government requested a sentence within the guideline range.  The district court, however, varied upwards to 87 months' imprisonment on account of Mr. Mosley's criminal activity and background.  Subsequently, in its Statement of Reasons, the district court stated it imposed the sentence, in part, because the weapon involved was stolen from the police department.  Mr. Mosley appealed, arguing that the district court erred in sentencing him based on that conclusion without first allowing him an opportunity to object. The Court agreed with Mr. Mosley.  It reaffirmed that under Jones, a district court must elicit fully articulated objections, following imposition of sentence, to the court's ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The district court here did not follow the Jones procedure.  No one mentioned that the firearm had been stolen from [...]

In United States v. Stowers, No. 18-12569 (Apr. 20, 2022) (Jordan, Brasher, Anderson), the Court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motions to suppress. In this consolidated appeal, the Court answered several questions of first impression regarding Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which regulates the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications.  While investigating a suspected drug trafficking conspiracy, a Georgia Bureau of Investigation agent secured a wiretap authorization order from a state judge. The wiretap ultimately implicated the nine named defendants in the conspiracy.  When federal authorities prosecuted them based on this state-gathered evidence, the defendants asked the district court to suppress the evidence on three grounds: (1) the state judge did not correctly seal the wiretap recordings as required under Title III; (2) the government impermissibly delayed sealing the wiretap recordings without providing a satisfactory explanation for the delay; and (3) the state court's wiretap authorization order exceeded its jurisdiction. The order authorizing the wiretap contained the following language: “Let return hereof and report as required by law be made before me within forty (40) days of date hereof or ten (10) days from the date of the last interception, whichever is earlier.” [...]

In United States v. Smith, No. 19-13056 (Apr. 19, 2022) (William Pryor, Jordan, Brown (N.D. Ga.)), the Court reversed the district court's denial of Mr. Smith's First Step Act motion and remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Smith was convicted of possession of 5 grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), and the brandishing of a firearm in the commission of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 210 months on the crack cocaine conviction, and a consecutive term of imprisonment of 84 months on the firearm conviction.  Based on Amendments 706 and 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, his sentence on the crack cocaine conviction was reduced to 168 months' imprisonment, and then to 135 months' imprisonment. After passage of the First Step Act, Mr. Smith wrote a letter to the district court asking whether he was eligible for a sentence reduction, and requesting the appointment of counsel to file a motion.  The district court appointed the Federal Public Defender's Office to represent Mr. Smith.  The probation office then prepared a memorandum advising the court that Mr. Smith was ineligible for a [...]

In United States v. Hakim, No. 19-11970 (Apr. 14, 2022) (William Pryor, Grant, Anderson), the Court vacated Mr. Hakim's conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The Court addressed whether a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel is knowing when a court gives materially incorrect or misleading information to the defendant about his potential maximum sentence.  Here, Mr. Hakim was found guilty after a jury trial on three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file a federal income tax return.  Although he was represented by counsel at trial, he was without counsel during the pretrial process.  At his arraignment, Mr. Hakim expressed his desire to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself.  The magistrate judge found that Mr. Hakim's waiver was knowing after misinforming him that the maximum sentence he could receive if convicted was 12 months imprisonment.  After trial, Mr. Hakim was sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment.  On appeal, Mr. Hakim argued that his waiver of counsel was not knowing. As an initial matter, the Court first clarified that the applicable standard of review on appeal was de novo--and not plain error--where a pro se defendant failed to contemporaneously object to the validity of his own waiver.  [...]

In United States v. Woodson, No. 20-10443 (Apr. 13, 2022) (Branch, Grant, Brasher), the Court affirmed Mr. Woodson's convictions and sentence. Mr. Woodson was charged with offenses relating to child pornography and extortionate interstate communications.  A jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 50 years' imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised release. On appeal, he first challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police without the benefit of Miranda warnings.  Approximately 15 officers arrived at the home Mr. Woodson shared with his family, including his brother Brandon, to execute a search warrant.  Mr. Woodson was asleep when the officers entered his bedroom, handcuffed him, and escorted him to the living room, where he joined his family.  Officers then interviewed Brandon outside of the home, inside a parked police van.  They determined that he was unlikely to be the culprit.  Mr. Woodson agreed to talk with officers next.  He was uncuffed and followed officers to the same parked police van.  He sat in the front passenger seat, with one detective in the driver's seat and another detective in the back seat.  Mr. Woodson was advised that he was not under arrest, [...]

In United States v. Moss, No. 19-14548 (Apr. 12, 2022) (William Pryor, Luck, Ed Carnes), the Court affirmed Mr. Moss's convictions, sentence, and restitution amount. Mr. Moss was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §  1349, and six counts of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §  1347.  After a jury trial, he was convicted of all counts.  He was sentenced to 97 months imprisonment, ordered to forfeit $2,507,623, and to pay $2,256,861 in restitution.  He appealed his convictions and sentence, as well as the restitution and forfeiture amounts. Mr. Moss raised three challenges to his convictions, which the Court found to be without any merit. As for his sentence, Mr. Moss challenged the loss amount used to determine his sentence, the dollar amount he had to pay in restitution, and the forfeiture amount.  The Court found no clear error in the district court's determinations.  With regard to the forfeiture determination, the Court found that forfeiture ordered under 18 U.S.C. §  982(a)(7)--"forfeit property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense"--encompasses the proceeds Mr. Moss received for providing legitimate services.  [...]