In United States v. Starr, 159 F.4th 901 (11th Cir. 2025) (Newsom, Jordan*, Honeywell (MDFL)), the Court affirmed the defendants’ interstate murder for hire convictions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. s. 1958,  arising from the murder of Jason Starr’s ex-wife, Sara Starr. In affirming the murder for hire convictions, the Court also held: The district court not violate the brother’s constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence of an alternate perpetrator, who had a “complicated relationship” with the victim, made odd statements prior to his suicide, and had a motorcycle that could have been the one seen outside of Sara’s home in the days leading up to her murder, where the alternate perpetrator had an apparent alibi at the time of the murder, the defendants did not identify any accomplice that could have committed the murder for the alternate perpetrator, and, generally, there was an insufficient “nexus” between him and the murder, such that the district court correctly excluded this evidence under Rule 403. The district court properly admitted Sara Starr’s out-of-court statement that “he’s going to kill me” to the friend who had just helped her secretly move out of the home she had shared with Jason, [...]

In United States v. Keegan, No. 22-13019 (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (Grant, Newsom, Abudu), the Court affirmed Keegan’s conviction for CP production, after a conditional guilty plea preserving Keegan’s right to appeal the district court’s pre-trial evidentiary ruling. The district court had excluded a defense expert psychologist’s proffered testimony about Keegan’s post-indictment statements, made to that defense expert, that she had been abused by her husband (the recipient of the CP that Keegan produced). Keegan argued that the statement was made for medical diagnosis, and thus admissible as a hearsay exception under FRE 803(4). The district court concluded that Keegan recounted the abuse “to prepare the witness to testify to a jury”—not for “diagnosis or treatment” and thus her statements did not satisfy FRE 803(4). After an extensive parsing of Fed. R. Evidence 803(4), the Court found no clear error and no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling excluding Keegan’s statements to the defense expert: “Between the plain text of Rule 803(4), the background of the traditional rules regarding medical testimony, and the district court’s factual findings . . .  we agree with the district court that because Keegan’s allegations of abuse were not made “for” medical [...]

In United States v. Erica Kelley Day, No. 24-13312 (11th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025) (Pryor CJ, Lagoa, Kidd)—also a government appeal—the Court held that a district court, when considering a government motion to depart from a statutory minimum for substantial assistance on one count, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) & USSG 5K1.1,  may not depart as to another count that is not subject to the government’s § 3553(e) motion. The Court also held that the government had not breached the plea agreement by filing a 5K motion only as to one count, because the plea agreement “referred only to section 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b),” “silence is not ambiguity,” “no promise was made about filing a § 3553(e) motion,” and the agreement “confirmed the government’s discretion to determine ‘the extent of any such departure request.’” The Court thus vacated Day’s sentence as to the count for which no § 3553(e) motion was filed and remanded for resentencing. Kidd wrote a concurrence outlining Day’s extraordinary recovery, rehabilitation, and cooperation post-arrest. I recommend reading it in full (page 8-10 of the below PDF). Referring to Abudu’s Perez concurrence, Kidd agreed that the “asymmetry” in  § 3553(e) “warrants reflection,” and closed by noting [...]

In United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez & Jovan Rivera Rodriguez, No. 23-12977 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (Pryor CJ, Branch, Abudu)—a government appeal—the Court held that a district court, when considering a government motion to depart from a statutory minimum for substantial assistance, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) & USSG 5K1.1,  may not depart further from the statutory minimum on the basis of other sentencing factors (e.g., 18 USC § 3553(a) factors) that do not relate to the substantial assistance provided. In coming to this primarily textual conclusion, the Court contrasted § 3553(e) with § 3553(f), in that the wording of the latter “safety-valve” subsection does “allow the district court to sentence as it pleases and to consider all the subsection (a) factors.” The Court also found that prior precedent compelled the same conclusion, and noted that every other circuit to consider this question had come to the same conclusion about § 3553(e).  Since the district court had imposed reduced sentences pursuant to both §§ 3553(e) and—over the government’s objections—(a) factors, the Court vacated and remanded the defendants’ sentences for resentencing. Abudu concurred “to highlight broader concerns about” the “asymmetry” that results from § 3553(e), and suggesting that, [...]

In United States v. Jy’Quale Samari Grable, No. 23-10544 (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2026) (Jordan, Lagoa, Tjoflat) the Court held “that a taking of property does not constitute robbery under the Hobbs Act unless force or threatened force is used before or during the taking.” And, because  Mr. Grable had “used force” (shot and killed two victims) “only after one of his co-conspirators had stolen marijuana and carried it away,” the Court set aside his substantive § 1951(a) conviction, as well as his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) & (j) convictions, which were premised on the alleged robbery. The Court thus also vacated his life plus twenty-year sentences as to the §§ 924(c) & (j) & 1951(a) convictions. The Court affirmed Mr. Grable’s conviction and 20-year sentence for HAR conspiracy. Full opinion here: https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202310544.pdf